There are certain events in the foreign policy realm that simply take the breath away. The scenes from Damascus, Syria, on Dec. 8, signaling the fitting end to a half-century of brutal familial dictatorship in the heart of the Middle East, fall into the breathtaking category. Fourteen years after the start of the Arab Spring, the end of the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad in a lightning offensive by a disparate group of Islamic rebel factions represents a potential monumental shift in the balance of power in this troubled region. 

The coming weeks and months will challenge the new rulers in Damascus in myriad ways. An immediate prerequisite for successful staying power will be cooperation among the different groups involved in the rebellion, led primarily by the Sunni Islamic group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Should they peacefully establish a responsible transitional government, form a working relationship with the Kurds who rule roughly one quarter of the country and set a realistic timeframe for elections to select new leaders, positive political shockwaves will likely reverberate across the Middle East.

If, however, the demise of the Assad regime leads to a new civil war in the country and the proximate descent into failed statehood, the revolution will be considered a tragic failure.

Nevertheless, an initial analysis of the disintegration of the Assad government reveals clear geopolitical winners and losers. Regarding the latter, Iran has lost one of its most trusted and longstanding allies in its bloody proxy war with Israel. For many years, Syria served as a staging area, forward operating base and weapons depot for operations against Israel by both Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, specifically its Quds Force that specializes in unconventional warfare and intelligence-gathering. Absent that power projection platform, combined with the significant degradation of Hezbollah’s military potency in the Levant, markedly weakens Tehran’s ability to spread malign influence in the historic center of the Arab world. 

As of this writing (Dec. 8) it is not clear what will become of Russia’s strategic naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast in Tartus and their air base just to the north in Latakia. The Russians used both of these facilities to support the al-Assad regime, in the process mercilessly pounding rebel groups in the northwest of the country.

It is almost certain that Tsar Vladimir (I want to be) the Great will have to cut and run from both bases. Such a withdrawal would represent a strategic setback for Moscow, denying the Kremlin its most-important military real estate in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Syrian debacle will be rightly judged as an indirect consequence of the war in Ukraine, where Moscow’s preoccupation seemingly blinded it to the growing danger to its Syrian ally. 

Additionally, it is worth noting that the precipitous collapse of the Assad cabal in Damascus will send shivers down the spine of similar autocrats – Putin, Maduro, Ayatollah Khamenei, and Xi Jingping – across the globe. The recent turn of events show that while dictatorial rule may seem omnipotent, the seeds of regime loyalty in autocratic societies rarely have strong roots. In Syria, the tipping point to the “emperor has no clothes” moment came with astonishing alacrity that surprised even seasoned observers of the region. Moscow, Tehran, Caracas, and other autocratic centers will ignore the lessons of Syria at their own peril. 

On the winning side of the ledger, Turkey and Israel immediately come to mind. For the Turks, the rebel victory to the south opens the door for a resolution of the country’s refugee crisis. Hosting nearly 3½ million Syrian refugees, Ankara is desperate for relief from this growing economic and social burden.  A peaceful and orderly transition to a new government in Damascus would likely result in the return home of a significant number of the refugees. Furthermore, Iran’s and Russia’s loss in Syria will likely translate to increased Turkish influence throughout the eastern Mediterranean littoral. 

As for Israel, the exit of an Iranian puppet regime to its immediate northeast significantly changes the balance of power equation in the region. Hezbollah, in addition to being battered militarily over the past year, now loses its main Iranian supply line, further diminishing the group’s ability to threaten the Jewish state. While Tel Aviv still faces enemies across the Middle East and a seemingly intractable crisis in Gaza, Assad’s ignominious decamping to Moscow renders Israel’s immediate neighborhood considerably less menacing.  

Not lost in this drama is the position of the United States, which still maintains a force, mostly in the Kurdish controlled zone in northeast Syria, of roughly 900 troops.  While incoming President Donald Trump may be correct in his “not our war” statements, Washington should use this opportunity, with a nuanced combination of carrot and stick, to improve stability in the region, particularly with respect to Iran. Given Tehran’s increasingly weakened position as a result of recent events, the mullahs may be more receptive to meaningful negotiations to curtail both their nuclear ambitions and their malevolent activities in exchange for sanction relief and other economic incentives.  

Thus, the new reality in the Levant is pregnant with both baleful challenges and promising opportunities. Let’s hope that our elected leaders, both outgoing and incoming, seize this chance to ameliorate the animosities of the past in pursuit of a more stable, peaceful Middle East.

Robert Beck of Peterborough served for 30 years overseas with the United States government in embassies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. He now teaches foreign policy classes at Keene State College’s Cheshire Academy for Lifelong Learning.